29 Chapter 1 from The Subjection of Women (1869)
John Stuart Mill
John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was born in London, England, on May 20, 1806. Mill was heavily influenced by his father James Mill (1773–1836), who was mentored by Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarian philosophy (Harris). James Mill raised and educated his son under his strict utilitarian beliefs, which put J.S Mill under immense pressure to achieve great academic success at a very young age. Despite his initial successes, he had what he deemed a “mental crisis” during 1826–1827 (Harris), in which he questioned his father’s strict approach to utilitarianism. He emerged with a new approach to life that proposed that “the enjoyments of life […] are sufficient to make it a pleasant thing […] without being made a principal object” (Autobiography 142). Mill’s beliefs on how people and society should exist were very progressive for the Victorian era, as apparent in his many written works, including The Subjection of Women. Much of Mill’s later work and politics were influenced by his wife Harriet Taylor (1807–1858), whom he met in 1830 and married in 1851, two years after the death of her husband, John Taylor (Harris). In his Autobiography, Mill “claimed that […] she had contributed substantially” to all but one of “his mature writings and had personally inspired or redrafted parts of them” (Harris). He also declared their relationship “the honour and chief blessing of [his] existence” (Autobiography 185) and wrote that that Taylor played a major role in his development of The Subjection of Women, even though it was published nine years after her passing (Autobiography 244). Mill continued to publish his writing and advocate for the betterment of society until he died in 1873.
The Subjection of Women was originally published in London in 1869 by Longman Publishing. In this piece, Mill appeals primarily to logos and draws on utilitarianism when he insists that society’s improvement depends on women being released from subjugation so they can demonstrate their full potential. Mill “argues that the subjection of women has been justified by the claim that it is natural for men to dominate women. Women, so the claim goes, are naturally inferior to men” (Smith 182). He presents evidence that this claim of men’s inherent power over women has continually operated throughout history. A key element of The Subjection of Women is Mill’s conviction that women’s position in society is not modern and is “now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement.” Throughout this chapter, Mill emphasizes the idea that, until society grants women freedom, “it is impossible to know” their “true nature” (Smith 182). Although Mill uses now outdated and at times racist rhetoric in his argument, The Subjection of Women was originally seen as quite progressive and remains a crucial piece in the history of feminism.
The object of this Essay is to explain as clearly as I am able, the grounds of an opinion which I have held from the very earliest period when I had formed any opinions at all on social or political matters, and which, instead of being weakened or modified, has been constantly growing stronger by the progress of reflection and the experience of life: That the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the two sexes—the legal subordination of one sex to the other—is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement;[1] and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability[2] on the other.
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Some will object, that a comparison cannot fairly be made between the government of the male sex and the forms of unjust power which I have adduced in illustration of it,[3] since these are arbitrary, and the effect of mere usurpation,[4] while it[5] on the contrary is natural.[6] But was there ever any domination which did not appear natural to those who possessed it? There was a time when the division of mankind into two classes, a small one of masters and a numerous one of slaves, appeared, even to the most cultivated minds, to be a natural, and the only natural, condition of the human race. No less an intellect, and one which contributed no less to the progress of human thought, than Aristotle, held this opinion without doubt or misgiving; and rested it on the same premises on which the same assertion in regard to the dominion of men over women is usually based, namely that there are different natures among mankind, free natures, and slave natures; that the Greeks were of a free nature, the barbarian races of Thracians[7] and Asiatics[8] of a slave nature.[9] But why need I go back to Aristotle? Did not the slaveowners of the Southern United States maintain the same doctrine, with all the fanaticism with which men cling to the theories that justify their passions and legitimate their personal interests? Did they not call heaven and earth to witness that the dominion of the white man over the black is natural, that the black race is by nature incapable of freedom, and marked out for slavery? some even going so far as to say that the freedom of manual labourers is an unnatural order of things anywhere. Again, the theorists of absolute monarchy have always affirmed it to be the only natural form of government; issuing from the patriarchal, which was the primitive and spontaneous form of society, framed on the model of the paternal, which is anterior to society itself, and, as they contend, the most natural authority of all. Nay, for that matter, the law of force itself, to those who could not plead any other, has always seemed the most natural of all grounds for the exercise of authority. Conquering races[10] hold it to be Nature’s own dictate that the conquered should obey the conquerors, or, as they euphoniously paraphrase it,[11] that the feebler and more unwarlike races should submit to the braver and manlier. The smallest acquaintance with human life in the middle ages, shows how supremely natural the dominion of the feudal nobility over men of low condition appeared to the nobility themselves, and how unnatural the conception seemed, of a person of the inferior class claiming equality with them, or exercising authority over them. It hardly seemed less so to the class held in subjection. The emancipated serfs and burgesses, even in their most vigorous struggles, never made any pretension to a share of authority; they only demanded more or less of limitation to the power of tyrannizing over them. So true is it that unnatural generally means only uncustomary, and that everything which is usual appears natural. The subjection of women to men being a universal custom, any departure from it quite naturally appears unnatural. But how entirely, even in this case, the feeling is dependent on custom, appears by ample experience. Nothing so much astonishes the people of distant parts of the world, when they first learn anything about England, as to be told that it is under a queen: the thing seems to them so unnatural as to be almost incredible. To Englishmen this does not seem in the least degree unnatural, because they are used to it; but they do feel it unnatural that women should be soldiers or members of parliament. In the feudal ages, on the contrary, war and politics were not thought unnatural to women, because not unusual; it seemed natural that women of the privileged classes should be of manly character, inferior in nothing but bodily strength to their husbands and fathers. The independence of women seemed rather less unnatural to the Greeks than to other ancients, on account of the fabulous Amazons[12](whom they believed to be historical), and the partial example afforded by the Spartan women;[13], who, though no less subordinate by law than in other Greek states,[14] were more free in fact, and being trained to bodily exercises in the same manner with men, gave ample proof that they were not naturally disqualified for them. There can be little doubt that Spartan experience suggested to Plato, among many other of his doctrines, that of the social and political equality of the two sexes.[15]
But, it will be said,[16] the rule of men over women differs from all these others in not being a rule of force: it is accepted voluntarily; women make no complaint, and are consenting parties to it. In the first place, a great number of women do not accept it. Ever since there have been women able to make their sentiments known by their writings (the only mode of publicity which society permits to them), an increasing number of them have recorded protests against their present social condition: and recently many thousands of them, headed by the most eminent women known to the public, have petitioned Parliament for their admission to the Parliamentary Suffrage. The claim of women to be educated as solidly, and in the same branches of knowledge, as men, is urged with growing intensity, and with a great prospect of success; while the demand for their admission into professions and occupations hitherto closed against them, becomes every year more urgent. Though there are not in this country, as there are in the United States, periodical Conventions and an organized party to agitate for the Rights of Women,[17] there is a numerous and active Society organized and managed by women, for the more limited object of obtaining the political franchise.[18] Nor is it only in our own country and in America that women are beginning to protest, more or less collectively, against the disabilities under which they labour. France, and Italy, and Switzerland, and Russia now afford examples of the same thing. How many more women there are who silently cherish similar aspirations, no one can possibly know; but there are abundant tokens how many would cherish them, were they not so strenuously taught to repress them as contrary to the proprieties of their sex. It must be remembered, also, that no enslaved class ever asked for complete liberty at once.
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All causes, social and natural, combine to make it unlikely that women should be collectively rebellious to the power of men. They are so far in a position different from all other subject classes, that their masters require something more from them than actual service. Men do not want solely the obedience of women, they want their sentiments. All men, except the most brutish, desire to have, in the woman most nearly connected with them, not a forced slave but a willing one, not a slave merely, but a favourite. They have therefore put everything in practice to enslave their minds. The masters of all other slaves rely, for maintaining obedience, on fear; either fear of themselves, or religious fears. The masters of women wanted more than simple obedience, and they turned the whole force of education to effect their purpose. All women are brought up from the very earliest years in the belief that their ideal of character is the very opposite to that of men; not self-will, and government by self-control, but submission, and yielding to the control of others. All the moralities tell them that it is the duty of women, and all the current sentimentalities that it is their nature, to live for others; to make complete abnegation of themselves, and to have no life but in their affections. And by their affections are meant the only ones they are allowed to have—those to the men with whom they are connected, or to the children who constitute an additional and indefeasible tie between them and a man. When we put together three things—first, the natural attraction between opposite sexes;[19] secondly, the wife’s entire dependence on the husband, every privilege or pleasure she has being either his gift, or depending entirely on his will; and lastly, that the principal object of human pursuit, consideration, and all objects of social ambition, can in general be sought or obtained by her only through him, it would be a miracle if the object of being attractive to men had not become the polar star of feminine education and formation of character. And, this great means of influence over the minds of women having been acquired, an instinct of selfishness made men avail themselves of it to the utmost as a means of holding women in subjection, by representing to them meekness, submissiveness, and resignation of all individual will into the hands of a man, as an essential part of sexual attractiveness. Can it be doubted that any of the other yokes which mankind have succeeded in breaking, would have subsisted till now if the same means had existed, and had been as sedulously used, to bow down their minds to it? If it had been made the object of the life of every young plebeian to find personal favour in the eyes of some patrician, of every young serf with some seigneur; if domestication with him, and a share of his personal affections,[20] had been held out as the prize which they all should look out for, the most gifted and aspiring being able to reckon on the most desirable prizes; and if, when this prize had been obtained, they had been shut out by a wall of brass from all interests not centering in him, all feelings and desires but those which he shared or inculcated; would not serfs and seigneurs, plebeians and patricians, have been as broadly distinguished[21] at this day as men and women are? and would not all but a thinker here and there, have believed the distinction to be a fundamental and unalterable fact in human nature?
The preceding considerations are amply sufficient to show that custom, however universal it may be, affords in this case no presumption, and ought not to create any prejudice, in favour of the arrangements which place women in social and political subjection to men. But I may go farther, and maintain that the course of history, and the tendencies of progressive human society, afford not only no presumption in favour of this system of inequality of rights, but a strong one against it; and that, so far as the whole course of human improvement up to this time, the whole stream of modern tendencies, warrants any inference on the subject, it is, that this relic of the past is discordant with the future, and must necessarily disappear.
For, what is the peculiar character of the modern world—the difference which chiefly distinguishes modern institutions, modern social ideas, modern life itself, from those of times long past? It is, that human beings are no longer born to their place in life, and chained down by an inexorable bond to the place they are born to, but are free to employ their faculties, and such favourable chances as offer, to achieve the lot which may appear to them most desirable.
[…]
The social subordination of women thus stands out an isolated fact in modern social institutions; a solitary breach of what has become their fundamental law; a single relic of an old world of thought and practice exploded in everything else, but retained in the one thing of most universal interest; as if a gigantic dolmen,[22] or a vast temple of Jupiter Olympius,[23] occupied the site of St. Paul’s and received daily worship, while the surrounding Christian churches were only resorted to on fasts and festivals. This entire discrepancy between one social fact and all those which accompany it, and the radical opposition between its nature and the progressive movement which is the boast of the modern world, and which has successively swept away everything else of an analogous character, surely affords, to a conscientious observer of human tendencies, serious matter for reflection. It raises a primâ facie presumption[24] on the unfavourable side, far outweighing any which custom and usage could in such circumstances create on the favourable; and should at least suffice to make this, like the choice between republicanism and royalty, a balanced question.
The least that can be demanded is, that the question should not be considered as prejudged by existing fact and existing opinion, but open to discussion on its merits, as a question of justice and expediency: the decision on this, as on any of the other social arrangements of mankind, depending on what an enlightened estimate of tendencies and consequences may show to be most advantageous to humanity in general, without distinction of sex. And the discussion must be a real discussion, descending to foundations, and not resting satisfied with vague and general assertions. It will not do, for instance, to assert in general terms, that the experience of mankind has pronounced in favour of the existing system. Experience cannot possibly have decided between two courses, so long as there has only been experience of one. If it be said that the doctrine of the equality of the sexes rests only on theory, it must be remembered that the contrary doctrine also has only theory to rest upon. All that is proved in its favour by direct experience, is that mankind have been able to exist under it, and to attain the degree of improvement and prosperity which we now see; but whether that prosperity has been attained sooner, or is now greater, than it would have been under the other system, experience does not say. On the other hand, experience does say, that every step in improvement has been so invariably accompanied by a step made in raising the social position of women, that historians and philosophers have been led to adopt their elevation or debasement as on the whole the surest test and most correct measure of the civilization of a people or an age. Through all the progressive period of human history, the condition of women has been approaching nearer to equality with men. This does not of itself prove that the assimilation must go on to complete equality; but it assuredly affords some presumption that such is the case.
Neither does it avail anything to say that the nature of the two sexes adapts them to their present functions and position, and renders these appropriate to them. Standing on the ground of common sense and the constitution of the human mind, I deny that any one knows, or can know, the nature of the two sexes, as long as they have only been seen in their present relation to one another. If men had ever been found in society without women, or women without men, or if there had been a society of men and women in which the women were not under the control of the men, something might have been positively known about the mental and moral differences which may be inherent in the nature of each. What is now called the nature of women is an eminently artificial thing—the result of forced repression in some directions, unnatural stimulation in others. It may be asserted without scruple, that no other class of dependents have had their character so entirely distorted from its natural proportions by their relation with their masters; for, if conquered and slave races have been, in some respects, more forcibly repressed, whatever in them has not been crushed down by an iron heel has generally been let alone, and if left with any liberty of development, it has developed itself according to its own laws; but in the case of women, a hot-house and stove cultivation has always been carried on of some of the capabilities of their nature, for the benefit and pleasure of their masters. Then, because certain products of the general vital force sprout luxuriantly and reach a great development in this heated atmosphere and under this active nurture and watering, while other shoots from the same root, which are left outside in the wintry air, with ice purposely heaped all round them, have a stunted growth, and some are burnt off with fire and disappear; men, with that inability to recognise their own work which distinguishes the unanalytic mind, indolently believe that the tree grows of itself in the way they have made it grow, and that it would die if one half of it were not kept in a vapour bath and the other half in the snow.
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Hence, in regard to that most difficult question, what are the natural differences between the two sexes—a subject on which it is impossible in the present state of society to obtain complete and correct knowledge—while almost everybody dogmatizes upon it, almost all neglect and make light of the only means by which any partial insight can be obtained into it. This is, an analytic study of the most important department of psychology, the laws of the influence of circumstances on character. For, however great and apparently ineradicable the moral and intellectual differences between men and women might be, the evidence of their being natural differences could only be negative. Those only could be inferred to be natural which could not possibly be artificial—the residuum, after deducting every characteristic of either sex which can admit of being explained from education or external circumstances. The profoundest knowledge of the laws of the formation of character is indispensable to entitle any one to affirm even that there is any difference, much more what the difference is, between the two sexes considered as moral and rational beings; and since no one, as yet, has that knowledge, (for there is hardly any subject which, in proportion to its importance, has been so little studied), no one is thus far entitled to any positive opinion on the subject. Conjectures are all that can at present be made; conjectures more or less probable, according as more or less authorized by such knowledge as we yet have of the laws of psychology, as applied to the formation of character.
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One thing we may be certain of—that what is contrary to women’s nature to do, they never will be made to do by simply giving their nature free play. The anxiety of mankind to interfere in behalf of nature, for fear lest nature should not succeed in effecting its purpose, is an altogether unnecessary solicitude. What women by nature cannot do, it is quite superfluous to forbid them from doing. What they can do, but not so well as the men who are their competitors, competition suffices to exclude them from; since nobody asks for protective duties and bounties in favour of women; it is only asked that the present bounties and protective duties in favour of men should be recalled. If women have a greater natural inclination for some things than for others, there is no need of laws or social inculcation to make the majority of them do the former in preference to the latter. Whatever women’s services are most wanted for, the free play of competition will hold out the strongest inducements to them to undertake. And, as the words imply, they are most wanted for the things for which they are most fit; by the apportionment of which to them, the collective faculties of the two sexes can be applied on the whole with the greatest sum of valuable result.
The general opinion of men is supposed to be, that the natural vocation of a woman is that of a wife and mother. I say, is supposed to be, because, judging from acts—from the whole of the present constitution of society—one might infer that their opinion was the direct contrary. They might be supposed to think that the alleged natural vocation of women was of all things the most repugnant to their nature; insomuch that if they are free to do anything else—if any other means of living, or occupation of their time and faculties, is open, which has any chance of appearing desirable to them—there will not be enough of them who will be willing to accept the condition said to be natural to them. If this is the real opinion of men in general, it would be well that it should be spoken out. I should like to hear somebody openly enunciating the doctrine (it is already implied in much that is written on the subject)—“It is necessary to society that women should marry and produce children. They will not do so unless they are compelled. Therefore it is necessary to compel them.” The merits of the case would then be clearly defined. It would be exactly that of the slaveholders of South Carolina and Louisiana. “It is necessary that cotton and sugar should be grown. White men cannot produce them. Negroes will not, for any wages which we choose to give. Ergo they must be compelled.” An illustration still closer to the point is that of impressment.[25] Sailors must absolutely be had to defend the country. It often happens that they will not voluntarily enlist. Therefore there must be the power of forcing them. How often has this logic been used! and, but for one flaw in it, without doubt it would have been successful up to this day. But it is open to the retort—First pay the sailors the honest value of their labour. When you have made it as well worth their while to serve you, as to work for other employers, you will have no more difficulty than others have in obtaining their services. To this there is no logical answer except “I will not:” and as people are now not only ashamed, but are not desirous, to rob the labourer of his hire, impressment is no longer advocated. Those who attempt to force women into marriage by closing all other doors against them, lay themselves open to a similar retort. If they mean what they say, their opinion must evidently be, that men do not render the married condition so desirable to women, as to induce them to accept it for its own recommendations. It is not a sign of one’s thinking the boon one offers very attractive, when one allows only Hobson’s choice, “that or none.”[26] And here, I believe, is the clue to the feelings of those men, who have a real antipathy to the equal freedom of women. I believe they are afraid, not lest women should be unwilling to marry, for I do not think that any one in reality has that apprehension; but lest they should insist that marriage should be on equal conditions; lest all women of spirit and capacity should prefer doing almost anything else, not in their own eyes degrading, rather than marry, when marrying is giving themselves a master, and a master too of all their earthly possessions. And truly, if this consequence were necessarily incident to marriage, I think that the apprehension would be very well founded. I agree in thinking it probable that few women, capable of anything else, would, unless under an irresistible entrainement, rendering them for the time insensible to anything but itself, choose such a lot, when any other means were open to them of filling a conventionally honourable place in life: and if men are determined that the law of marriage shall be a law of despotism, they are quite right, in point of mere policy, in leaving to women only Hobson’s choice. But, in that case, all that has been done in the modern world to relax the chain on the minds of women, has been a mistake. They never should have been allowed to receive a literary education. Women who read, much more women who write, are, in the existing constitution of things, a contradiction and a disturbing element: and it was wrong to bring women up with any acquirements but those of an odalisque,[27] or of a domestic servant.
1. How did Mill’s argument in The Subjection of Women align with Victorian values?
2. Despite being written in the latter half of the nineteenth century, The Subjection of Women shares many elements with Romantic literature. How do you think Romantic values influenced Mill’s argument? Do you think this impacted how Victorians read and criticized Mill’s work?
- This rhetoric is still used in defenses of feminism, especially in empowering women in impoverished countries, where educating women returns financial dividends. As Jasmin Owen points out, “Education empowers [a woman] to build a better life for herself, contributing to the health, safety and prosperity of her family and community. In fact, a one percentage point increase in female education rates raises the average GDP for her country by 0.3 percentage points.” –K.H. ↵
- Victorians did not use the word disability in the sense we use it now, referring specifically to mental and physical impairments. Rather, it meant disadvantage in general. –K.H. ↵
- In the previous section, which I have cut from the reading for brevity’s sake, Mill compared the subjection of women to slavery and to “the rule of mere force,” in which the physically stronger person or group takes control of a weaker person or group. –K.H. ↵
- Mill compares gender relations that oppress women with slavery. He points out that even though most people argue that slavery and women’s oppression are not comparable, in both situations, those with power have deemed the system as a natural way to live. The use of usurpation is to show that the opposing argument’s claim of “unjust power” being natural is a “claim or assertion that is unwarranted; [a mere] unjustified assumption” (“Usurpation, N” def. 1). The word usurpation is most commonly used in discussions about governmental power. ↵
- That is, the government or rule of the male sex. –K.H. ↵
- He is saying that other people will insist the subjection of women is natural, whereas slavery is not. –K.H. ↵
- The Thracians were among the many human tribes settling in central Europe during the Bronze Age. As the Greek and Roman empires expanded, “the Thracians were eventually expelled or absorbed” (“Bulgaria”). ↵
- The term Asiatic means “relating to, or belonging to Asia or its inhabitants” (“Asiatic, Adj.” def 1.a). –K.H. ↵
- In his treatise Politics, the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.) asserts that the barbarians (a term referring to non-Greek speakers) are inherently inferior to the Greeks; thus, their lot in life is servitude. “The peoples of Asia (i.e., Asia Minor),” he writes, “lack spirit, with the result that they continue to be subjected and enslaved” (qtd. in Harland, sec. 7.1327b). Elsewhere in Politics, he applies the same model to gender relationships, stating that “the male is by nature superior and the female inferior, the male ruler and the female subject” (qtd. in Harland, sec. 1.1255a). –E.Z. ↵
- Notice how he frames the debate in discourses of race as well. While his sentiment here is anticolonial, his use of racial discourse in the chapter is all too often troubling, with subtle white-supremacist resonances. –K.H. ↵
- To be euphonious means to be “pleasing to the ear,” though the term is “[o]ften used ironically” (“Euphonious, Adj.”). Mill suggests that conquerors use pleasant language to make the conquest of others sound better than it actually is. ↵
- In Greek mythology, the Amazons are a “race of warrior women led by a queen” (Leeming). Despite the oppression faced by women in ancient Greece, Mill refers to the mythological Amazons as one of the “exceptions” in history where women having power (i.e., rights and freedoms) was seen as natural. ↵
- In the city-state of Sparta, the women were granted similar rights and freedoms as men, such as land ownership, “complete freedom of movement,” and other legal rights (Fleck and Hanssen 224). Furthermore, Spartan “social norms” differed from those of other ancient Greek city states, meaning that all Spartan girls received an education and Spartan women were expected to manage their husbands’ properties (224, 234). Mill alludes to the Spartans to support his argument that what is deemed natural and unnatural in his current (Victorian) society can and should be changed. ↵
- In Mill’s discussion about the lack of rights for women throughout history, he refers to the exceptions within certain ancient Greek socieities and beliefs. These freedoms and rights did not apply to the majority of ancient Greece, which Mill mentions. For instance, in Athens, “women were not allowed to own property, received little education, and faced severe restrictions on their ability to move about in public” (Fleck and Hanssen 222). ↵
- Plato (428–348 B.C.E.), one of the great ancient Greek philosophers (“Plato”), wrote the Republic, a long series of dialogues between Socrates and other men about how justice functions at the individual and societal level (“The Republic”). In Book 5, Socrates addresses the “women question” and defends his earlier assertion that, amongst the ruling class, females and males should receive an equal education. Here, Mill suggests that Sparta’s laws inspired Socrates’ conclusion that “it is not unnatural to give training of mind and body to the females as guardians” (Republic 5.473). ↵
- That is, people in disagreement with him will say. –K.H. ↵
- Mill here refers to the National Women’s Rights conventions held in America since 1853, inspired by the regional women’s rights conventions that had been held since the Seneca Falls convention in 1848 (Isenberg). The organized party to which he refers is likely the American Equal Rights Association, founded by Elizabeth C. Stanton and Susan B. Anthony in 1866, or the National Woman Suffrage Association, founded by the same in 1869 (Borish). –K.H. ↵
- Here he refers to the National Society for Women’s Suffrage, formed in 1867 (Smith 9). –K.H ↵
- When Mill asserts that heterosexuality is “natural,” it logically follows that Mill assumes that homosexuality is “unnatural.” It also ignores the many homosexual relationships that did exist, despite being either taboo or illegal at the time. –K.H. ↵
- Here, by bringing in the discourse of political economy, Mill overtly shows how gender roles are also a matter of political economy. –K.H. ↵
- That is, as different in behaviour and expectations. –K.H. ↵
- A dolmen is “a prehistoric structure” where “a large flattish stone is supported upon two or more smaller upright stones” (“Dolmen, N.”). ↵
- Mill alludes to the remains of the Roman temple dedicated to Jupiter. This temple was built in Rome in 509 B.C.E., marking the moment when the Romans overthrew their monarchy and became a republic (“Ancient Rome”). ↵
- Primâ facie refers to that which is “based […] on the first impression” (“Prima Facie, Adj. & N.”). Mill claims that the “women question” cannot be discussed in a fair (or worthwhile) manner because it is hindered by preexisting opinions about the nature of the two sexes. ↵
- Impressment is the “enforcement of military or saval service on able-bodied but unwilling men through crude and violent methods” (“Impressment”), which Mill compares to the subjection of women in the illustration that follows. ↵
- The term Hobson’s choice refers to “taking either what is available or nothing at all,” which essentially means there is no real choice (“Hobson’s Choice, N.” def. 1). ↵
- The term odalisque refers to “a female slave or concubine in a harem” (“Odalisque, N.”); here, Mills again compares women’s subjection to slavery, this time with Orientalist and sexualized connotations. ↵